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NOTE
MINNESOTA LAND CONTRACT LAW IN ACTION*
Much has been written concerning the various legal problems
arising between a vendor and purchaser under a contract for the
sale of land.' Emphasis is usually placed on the strength and
multitude of the remedies available to the vendor and the dire consequences that may easily befall the defaulting purchaser. However,
little thought has been given to the interrelated legal and economic
problems encompassing the purchase of a farm by use of this
medium. It is hoped that this Note will serve three purposes: (1) a
review of the substantive law of vendor and purchaser in the State
of Minnesota; (2) a disclosure of the basic economic and legal
problems created by this law in farm purchases and a comparison
with the mortgagor-mortgagee relationship, and (3) an evaluation
of the solution to these problems (a) by adherence of the legal
profession to the sixth canon of ethics or (b) by legislation.
VENDOR'S REMEDIES

Prior to the passage of Chapter 223 of the Laws of 18972 the
judicial decisions of the State of Minnesota provided that when
*This Note is the outgrowth of a cooperative study undertaken in 1954
by the Law School, and the Department of Agricultural Economics, Institute
of Agriculture, of the University of Minnesota. It is a contributing study in a

North Central Regional research project investigating the problems of
getting started in farming. In addition to research funds of the University,
the Farm Foundation, Chicago, Ill., has generously given financial support.
1. A contract for the sale of land may be termed a land contract, a
contract for deed, or a bond for deed.
2. This act is the origin of Minn. Stat. § 559.21 (1953).
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time was of the essence of a contract, the vendor could cancel the
contract in the manner provided therein.3 This meant that if no
provision was made for giving notice to the purchaser, he might
forfeit all rights as of the day of breach by a default in any of the
contract terms.4 However, where time was not declared to be of
the essence of the contract, the courts were somewhat more liberal.5
Therefore, before the vendor could cancel the contract he was
required to notify the vendee to perform and allow him a reasonable
time in which to do so.,

In contrast to the strictness indicated above, it was within the
court's discretion, in an equitable action to foreclose a land contract,
either to allow a strict foreclosure or permit foreclosure by sale.7
Moreover, in those instances where strict foreclosure was allowed,
the court almost invariably established a time for payment in excess
of thirty days from the time of trial.8 At first, granting extra time
was a matter of pure discretion with the "chancellor," but later a
defaulting obligee was deemed to have a right to itY
& 0
supposedly designed to
In 1897 Minnesota passed a statute
1
alleviate the plight of the ve:adee. " This act, as amended, provides
that a vendor may terminate a contract for the conveyance of real
3. Johnson v. Eklund, 72 Nfinm. 195, 75 N. W. 14 (1898); True v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 72, 147 N. W. 948 (1914) (by implication);
see Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 Minn. L. Rev. 329, 345
(1921). Where the vendor hdd an "election" to cancel the contract, he could
not do so secretly. In such cases he must inform the purchaser of his decision
prior to the time for payment, or if after default, a reasonable time must be
allowed for payment. O'Connor v. Hughes, 35 Minn. 446, 68 N. W. 182 (1886).
4. See Jandric v. Skahen, 235 Minn. 256, 260, 50 N. W. 2d 625, 628
(1951) ; Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild, 166 Minn. 58, 61, 206 N. W. 948,
949 (1926). Nor was it necessary that a vendee be given notice to quit in order
that his vendor might maintain an action of ejectment. See McClane v. White,
5 Minn. (Gil. 139, 146) 178, 186 (1860).
5. Where time is not of-the essence, a court of equity may allow payment to me made after the time agreed upon. See, e.g., Dahl v. Pross, 6 Minn.
(Gil 38, 42) 89, 93 (1861).
6. See Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild, 166 Minn. 58, 61, 206 N. V.
948, 949 (1926) ; Austin v. Wacks, 30 Minn. 335, 340, 15 N. W. 409, 411
(1883).
7. See Denton v. Scully, 26 Minn. 325, 326-327, 4 N. W. 41, 42-43
(1879). Strict foreclosure was not allowed in a majority of jurisdictions. See
Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 344
(1930).
8. Drew v. Smith, 7 Minn. (Gil. 231) 301 (1862) (six months); cf.
Eberlein v. Randall, 99 Minn. 528, 109 N. W. 1133 (1906) (ninety days);
London v. Northwest Am. Mortgage Co. v. McMillan, 78 Minn. 53, 80 N. W.
841 (1899) (ninety days).
9. See Drew v. Smith, 7 Minn. (Gil. 231, 238) 301, 309-310 (1862).
10. Minn. Gen. Laws 1897, .:.223.
11. As aptly stated by the Iowa Supreme Court in Waters v. Pearson,
163 Iowa 391, 397, 144 N. W. 1026, 1929 (1914), concerning a similar
Iowa statute, "[the statute] is a merciful provision . . . extending a little
grace to a party in default who may be staggering under the load of his
undertaking."

NOTE

estate because of default by serving notice on the purchaser stating
the mode of default and that the contract will terminate thirty days
after service of the notice unless the purchaser removes the default
and pays the costs of service within that time. 1" Its "... primary
purpose ...

is to prevent the vendor taking advantage, through a

provision in the contract, or otherwise, of the vendee's failure to
make payments on time or of other defaults, and depriving him of
his rights in the property without a definite notice of cancellation."'"
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that this statute provided a remedy in the nature of a statutory strict foreclosure, 14 it would appear that two interpretive results were possible. First, the court could have allowed various equitable defenses
in proper cases, thus giving the defaulting vendee additional time
over and above the thirty days granted by the statute. This result
could be supported by the theory that this statute was designed to
benefit the vendee, that thirty days was a minimum notice time, and
that where equity required more time it should be allowed as it
was before the statute was enacted." Second, the court could have
interpreted the statute strictly, thereby allowing the defaulting
vendee only thirty days from the service of notice regardless of
counterbalancing equities. The latter course was followed,'8 adding
force to the statement of Professor Ballantine that "[t] he vigorous
12. Minn. Stat. § 559.21 (1953).
"When default is made in the conditions of any contract for the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein, whereby the vendor has the
right to terminate the same, he may do so by serving upon the purchaser,
his personal representatives or assigns . . . a notice specifying the conditions in which default has been made, and stating that such contract will
terminate 30 days after the service of such notice unless prior thereto the
purchaser, shall comply with such conditions and pay costs of service. Such
notice must be given notwithstanding any provisions in the contract to the
contrary...
"... In case of. .. service by publication... the notice shall ... state
that such contract will terminate 90 days after the service of such notice.
"If within the time mentioned, the person served complies with such
conditions and pays the costs of service, the contract shall be thereby reinstated; but otherwise shall terminate."
13. Mathwig v. Ostrand, 132 Minn. 346, 348, 157 N. W. 589 (1916).
14. See Smith v. Dristig, 176 Minn. 601, 602, 224 N. W. 157 (1929);
Nolan v. Greeley, 150 Minn. 441, 442, 185 N. W. 647, 648 (1921) ; Needles v.
Keys, 149 Minn. 477, 479, 184 N. W. 33, 34 (1921) ; International Realty
& Securities Corp. v. Vanderpoel, 127 Minn. 89, 92, 148 N. W. 895, 896 (1914).
15. See note 8 supra and text thereto.
16. E.g., Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild, 166 Minn. 58, 206 N. W.
948 (1926). It would seem that the former interpretation was one the court
felt it could not make, for by 1924 its feeling was clearly expressed:
"We are dealing with an all too inelastic statute. It does not discriminate,
as law ought to discriminate, between those who deserve its indulgence and
those who leave forfeited all right to it. The vendee who in good faith has
made substantial payments, amounting possibly to a large portion of the purchase price, had added substantial value to the property by improvements and
is in possession, may be cancelled out, and possibly his entire estate forfeited,
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policy of equity with reference to bonds and mortgages has not
been carried out consistently in contracts generally."' 17 By applying
the statute as interpreted to those cases where time was not of the
essence of the contract,18 the conclusion is easily reached that more
frequently vendees are given less time to remove a default than
they were prior to the statute's enactment. 19
Other decisions regarding the statute were not as oppressive to
the purchaser, however. It is still possible for a vendor to waive
his right to a forfeiture by dealing with the purchaser as if the
contract still existed. For example, acceptance of the defaulted
amount as payment on the contract after expiration of the statutory thirty day waiting period constitutes a waiver as a matter of
law. 20 On the other hand, an acceptance of an overdue payment
after notice has been served for breach of a different
condition of
2
the contract will not waive the pending proceeding. '
In Needles v. Keys 22 the vendor had inserted in the contract an
acceleration clause by which he could declare the entire balance
of the contract due and payable upon default of the vendee. In
serving notice of default on the purchaser the vendor informed him
that the option was thereby exercised and payment of the entire
balance would be required to reinstate the contract. The court in
holding for the vendee stated:
"We think the legislature did not intend to permit him
[vendor], by his own act, to add to the conditions which the
vendee must perform to cure his default and save his equitable
rights. We think that the legislature intended that the contract
should not be forfeited if, within the prescribed time, the vendee
removed such defaults as were made grounds of forfeiture by
the terms of the contract itself. And we hold that in proceedings
under this statute, the ze.dor cannot, by exercising an option
to declare deferred instalments due immediately, require the
vendee to pay such deferred instalments or forfeit his contract [Italics added] ."23
just as summarily as the speculator who has made an insignificant down payment, is not in possession and does not intend further performance unless he
can make a profitable deal. The law ought not to be in that condition, but it is,
and it is our duty to apply it as we find it." Follingstad v. Syverson, 160 Minn.
307, 311, 200 N. W. 90, 92 (1924).
17. See Ballantine, supra note 3, at 341.
18. E.g., Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild, 166 Minn. 58, 206, N. XV.
948 (1926).
19. Compare the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 559.21 (1953), with the
cases cited in note 8 supra.
20. Jandric v. Skahen, 235 Minn. 256, 50 N. W. 2d 625 (1951). The
right to forfeiture could as easily be waived on contracts made prior to 1897.
Mo v. Bettner, 68 Minn. 179, 70 N. W. 1076 (1897).
21. Swanson v. Miller, 189 Minn. 158, 248 N. W. 727 (1933) (default
on assumed mortgage).
22. 149 Minn. 477, 184 N. W. 33 (1921).
23. Id. at 480, 184 N. W. at 34.

NOTE

While this case precludes the possibility of the vendor gaining an
advantage over a purchaser through the use of an "optional" or
"elective" acceleration clause, it appears through negative implication from the wording of the opinion that a provision in the contract automaticallyaccelerating the balance of the debt without any
action by the vendor would be upheld. Not only would this result
follow from the quoted case, but it is also in accord with general
principles of equity, 2 and in a majority of cases would probably
make reinstatements of the contract impossible. 25
Successful termination of the contract by the vendor precludes
him from obtaining a judgment for installments in arrears.2 8 Any
judgment obtained prior to termination for overdue installments
is subject to discharge of record,2 7 but payments already made are
2 8

forfeited.

While § 559.21 is undoubtedly the most widely used remedy for
a vendee's breach of land contract, the vendor is not limited to its
use alone. 29 However, it is the sole remedy which eliminates the
need for court procedure. 30 The vendor may bring an action for
specific performance,3 1 strict foreclosure,3

2

recission 3 or damages

for breach of contract ;34 and since it is within the sound discretion
24. A clause accelerating the remaining balance for default where
payment is being made in specified instalments is in no way a penalty and
will be enforced in both law and equity. 2 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence
(5th ed., Symons, 1941).
25. While the result would be in accord with general principles of
equity, see note 24 supraand text thereto, it would be an extremely inequitable
result.
26. Smith v. Dristig, 176 Minn. 601, 224 N. W. 157 (1929); accord,
Andresen v. Simon, 171 Minn. 168, 213 N. W. 563 (1927) ; see Des Moines
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Wyffels, 185 Minn. 476, 477, 241 N. W. 592, 593
(1932). It is doubtful whether a contract provision would be upheld which
made defaulted instalments a measure of liquidated damages payable to the
vendor after he has successfully terminated the contract. See Smith v. Dristig,
supra at 603, 224 N. W. at 157-158.
27. Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bang v. Wyffels, supranote 26; Warren v. Ward, 91 Minn. 254, 97 N. W. 886 (1904) ; see Citizens State Bank v.
Moebeck, 143 Minn. 291, 297, 173 N. W. 853, 855 (1919).
28. Andresen v. Simon, 171 Minn. 168, 213 N. W. 563 (1927) (mortggage foreclosure allowed when given for cash down payment) ; Citizens State
Bank v. Moebeck, supra note 27.
29. Bowers v. Norton, 169 Minn. 198, 210 N. W. 871 (1926) (specific
performance).
30. See State Bank of Milan v. Sylte, 162 Minn. 72, 74, 202 N. W.

70 (1925).

31. State Bank of Milan v. Sylte, supra note 30; Mathwig v. Ostrand,
132 Minn. 346, 157 N. W. 589 (1916).
32. State Bank of Milan v. Sylte, supra note 31. Foreclosure by action
"... is better for the vendee and gives him much more opportunity to protect
his rights than the statutory cancellation." Id. at 75, 202 N. W. at 71.
33. E.g., Hunter v. Holmes, 60 Minn. 496, 62 N. W. 1131 (1895) (by
implication).
34. E.g., Wilson v. Hoy, 120 Minn. 451, 139 N. W. 817 (1913).
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35
of the court whether a foreclosure should be strict or by sale,
nothing appears able to stop the vendor from obtaining a foreclosure
by sale with an attendant deficiency judgment in a proper case.36
To indicate the value of an alternative remedy, a comparison of
results achieved through use of § 559.21 and an action for damages
is appropriate. A sells a farm to B on contract at a price of $10,000
with a $1,000 down payment, the balance payable in one year. During this period land values ta&e an appreciable tumble so that the
land is worth but $7,500 at the year's end. B decides that he would
rather not pay $10,000 for land worth only $7,500 and defaults in
his payment. Now if A proceeds under § 559.21 he will recover the
farm worth $7,500 and retain the $1,000 down payment for a total
value of $8,500. If he brings an action for damages for breach, he
will still have the farm, and. in addition to retaining the $1,000
already paid, he will obtaain a judgment for $1,500. 37 Assuming
the total cost of litigation will be considerably less than the amount
of the judgment, A will be wiser to bring the latter action rather
than relying on the simpler procedure afforded him by § 559.21,
for he will now have the land worth $7,500, the down payment of
$1,000 and a judgment against B for $1,500 which total is equal
to the original contract price. From the foregoing hypothetical
situation the general principle can be formulated that whenever
the market value of the land. at the time of breach is sufficiently
below the contract price so as to exceed the amount already paid
by the purchaser, it will be to the advantage of the vendor to seek
recovery of damages 38 rathe:r than terminate the contract in accordance with § 559.21.39

VENDzE'S REMEDIES

Problems involving remedies available to the vendee need little
discussion. However, it might be well to insert a word of caution.
35. See note 7 supra and text thereto.
36. Cf. London & Northwes: Am. Mortgage Co. v. McMillan, 78 Minn.
53, 80 N. W. 841 (1899). For an able criticism of the atrocious result
reached in this case see Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts,
14 Minn. L. Rev. 342, 348 (1930).
It is also possible for a vendee to lose his rights by abandonment.
Mathwig v. Ostrand, 132 Minn. 346, 157 N. W. 489 (1916).
37. In an action for damages the vendor is entitled to recover the
difference between the contract price and market price at the time of the
breach. E.g., Wilson v. Hoy, 120 Minn. 451, 139 N. W. 817 (1913).
38. If A believes that land values will continue to decline, he should
bring an action for specific performance, which will place any subsequent
-loss on B. Conversely, if it appea-s that land is about to appreciate in value,
a damage action would be preferable.
39. Costs of litigation and inconvenience must be included in determining
the better remedy in a particular case.

NOTE
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If a vendee has suffered loss through misrepresentations of the
vendor and is desirous of maintaining an action for damages, thereby affirming the contract, he must bring the action prior to a
contract termination effectuated by the vendor. 40 It is highly probable that the vendee will afford the vendor an opportunity to terminate the contract, for what is more natural than to refuse to pay
when one feels cheated. If the vendee fails to institute timely proceedings, he will be relegated to an action for money had and received. 41 However, if the vendee has begun suit to rescind the
contract, a restraining order will be issued preventing service of
termination prior to a determination of the rescission
notice of
42
action.
APPICATION AND RESULTS OF THE DOCTRINE
OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION

Much of the substantive law applicable to contract for deed
concerns the doctrine of equitable conversion. 43 Underlying the
doctrine, and an excellent illustration of it, is the equitable principle
that ".

.

. equity regards that as done which ought to be done. ...

"4

Application of this doctrine to the law of vendor and purchaser is
limited by the specific enforceability of the contract. If for some
reason the contract is not specifically enforceable no conversion is
45
possible.
40. West v. Walker, 181 Minn. 169, 231 N. W. 826 (1930) ; cf. International Realty & Securities Corp v. Vanderpoel, 127 Minn. 89, 148 N. W. 895
(1914). It is interesting to note that although the court speaks in terms of a
completed cancellation, West v. Walker, supra at 171, 231 N. W. at 827, the
fact that the vendee starts his suit for damages prior to the expiration of the
thirtieth day will not effect a stoppage of the statutory termination action.
See Olson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 126 Minn. 229, 148 N. W. 67 (1914).
41. An action for money had and received would be governed by the
rules of recission. See id. at 233, 148 N. W. at 69. Since a termination action
renders the contract completely nugatory, the court was powerless to assert
that recision was available to the vendee, for inherent in this remedy is that
there be comething to rescind.
For an excellent opinion asserting that the vendee should be allowed recovery on a tort theory, thus obviating the legal anomaly indicated above, see
the dissenting opinion of Justice Stone in West v. Walker, 181 Minn. 169,
172-174, 231 N. W. 826, 828-829 (1930).
42. Freeman v. Fehr, 132 Minn. 384, 157 N. W. 587 (1916).
43. "A contract for the sale and purchase of land has always been
treated by the courts as creating an equitable conversion in favor of the seller
as well as in favor of the buyer." Langdell, Equ itable Conversion, 18 Harv.
L. Rev. 245, 255 (1905). And the conversion occurs when the contract right is
created. See Langdell, Equitable Conversion, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 321 (1906).
For an excellent critique of the application of this doctrine to land contracts, see Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 Col. L. Rev. 369
(1913), who expounds the theory that the same results could be reached
by more logical reasoning.
44. 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 24, at 472.
45. See 3 American Law of Property 62-63 (Casner ed. 1952) ; Langdell, Equitable Conversion, 18 Harv. L. Rev. 245, 251 (1905).
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In general, equitable conversion allocates the benefits and burdens incident to interests in the land between the parties to the
contract, and ".... as between the parties and third persons, it is
invoked to determine the devolution upon death of the rights and
liabilities of each party with respect to the land, and to ascertain
the powers of creditors of each party to reach the land in payment
that for all practical purposes
of their claims."'46 The effect, then, is
4
the vendee is the owner of the land. T
What does this mean specifically? First, that the vendee's interest will pass on his death to the devisee of his real estate, or if
he should die intestate, to his legal heirs.4 8 As would then be expected, the vendor's interest passes as personalty.45 Either the
vendor or vendee may sell" or mortgage 5' his interest, and the
vendee's interest may be leased. 52 Furthermore, the land may be
reached by creditors of either party,53 but execution on one party's
interest does not impair the rights of the other.5
46. See 3 American Law of :Property 63 (Casner ed. 1952).

47. See Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 457, 209 N. W. 323,
324 (1926). An executory contract for the sale of land makes the vendee
equitable owner while the vendor retains legal title as security for the purchase price. See, e.g., Minnesota Building & Loan Ass'n v. Closs, 182 Minn.
452, 454, 234 N. W. 872, 873 (1931) ; Shraiberg v. Hanson, 138 Minn. 80,
82, 163 N. W. 1032, 1033 (1917).
48. See, e.g., Chemedlin v. Prince, 15 Minn. (Gil. 263, 268) 331, 334335 (1870); see 1 Tiffany, Real Property § 307 (3d ed. 1939). Since the
trend today is to make a person's heirs and next of kin the same in most
cases for purposes of decent and distribution, see, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 525.16
(1953), the importance of the application of the doctrine in cases of intestacy
is greatly diminished.
49. See, e.g., Mark v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 159 Minn.
315, 317, 198 N. W. 1003-1004 (1924).
50. Paynesville Land Co. v. Grabow, 160 Mimn. 414, 200 N. W. 481
(1924) (vendee); Meyers v. Markham, 90 Minn. 230, 96 N. NV. 335, 787
(1903) (vendor). However, in the latter case the vendee can sue the vendor
for breach of contract or acquiesce in the transfer by dealing with the new
owner.
51. Stannard v. Marboe, 159 Minn. 119, 198 N. W. 127 (1924) (vendee).
The word "assigns" in § 559.21 includes the mortgagee of the vendee, and he
is entitled to notice of termination whenever the vendor has actual or constructive knowledge of the mortgage. Failure to give such notice leaves the
mortgage a lien against the contract and the land. Ibid.
52. Greenfield v. Olson, 143 Minn. 275, 173 N. W. 416 (1919).
53. Reynolds v. Fleming, 43 Minn. 513, 45 N. W. 1099 (1890). Even
where the vendee has not completed payments his interest is subject to sale
on execution with the purchaser being placed in the vendee's shoes and entitled
to complete the purchase and demand a deed. Judgment liens are attachable
to the vendee's interest. Hook v. Northwest Thresher Co., 91 Minn. 482, 98
N. W. 463 (1904).
In the case of a vendor a judgment is a lien only against his remaining
interest in the land and thus is enforceable only to the extent of the unpaid
purchase money. See Berryhill v. Potter, 42 Minn. 279, 280, 44 N. W. 251
(1890). Such a lien is discharged by the payment of the balance due. See 3
American Law of Property 85 (Casner ed. 1952).
54. See W. T. Bailey Lumber Co. v. Hendrickson, 185 Minn. 251, 252,
240 N. W. 666 (1932).

1954]

NOTE

Another important effect of the doctrine of equitable conversion
is that loss occasioned by injury to the property which is the subject of the contract is generally laid at the vendee's doorstep 55 although some jurisdictions adopt the contrary view56 and still
others have adopted the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act
which places this loss on the party in possession. 57 While Minnesota appears to agree with the majority view where the vendee has
paid part of the purchase price and is in possession,5 it remains
an open question as to who would bear the risk of loss where nothing more had been done than the mere signing of the contract. 59
In those jurisdictions where risk of loss is on the vendee an
additional problem arises. If only the vendor has taken out insurance and part or all of the subject property is destroyed, who is to
receive the proceeds of the policy? In England and in some jurisdictions of the United States the judicial rule is that the proceeds
shall inure to the benefit of the vendor thus allowing him to collect twice. The trend in this country, however, seems to be to
allow the proceeds to stand in the place of the property thus reducing the amount of the purchase price.60 Although the Minnesota
court has not decided the exact point under discussion, there can be
little question but that its decision will be in accord with the latter,
more equitable, view. 61 Such a decision should be augmented with
the holding that the cost of the vendor's premiums be charged to the
vendee. However, since both vendor and vendee have insurable
55. See Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 127-130
(1924).
56. See Note, 6 Minn. L. Rev. 513, 515 (1922).
57. 9a U. L. A. Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act 357 (1951).
58. See Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 455-456, 209 N. W.
323, 324 (1926) ; Mark v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 159 Minn.
315, 320, 198 N. W. 1003, 1005 (1924). However, notice that the court places
emphasis on the element of possession. See Summers v. Midland Co., supra
at 455, 209 N. W. at 324.
59. In Teig v. Linster, 150 Minn. 111, 184 N. W. 609 (1921), the court
points out that there are authorities both ways and then finds it unnecessary
to decide the question. See id. at 113, 184 N. W. at 609.
For an interesting discussion of risk of loss concluding that the risk
should remain with the vendor unless a contrary intent be implied, and that
possession may or may not be the controlling element to indicate such intent,
see Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between the Date of Contract to Sell
Real Estate and Transfer of Title, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 127 (1924).
60. See 3 Corbin, Contracts § 670 (1951) ; 3 American Law of Property
§ 11.31 (Casner ed. 1952).
61. Cf. Cetkowski v. Knutson, 163 Minn. 492, 204 N. W. 528 (1925)
(vendor collects proceeds of insurance running to vendee where vendor
allowed to rescind for fraud subsequent to destruction of the property).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:93

interests6 2 until the contract is fully performed, the above problem
should not be allowed to arise.
Other results of the law cf vendor and purchaser which are at
least in part explicable by the doctrine of equitable conversion include the following: (1) the vendee is allowed the condemnation
award in eminent domain proceedings ;63 (2) a spouse's statutory
marital interest attaches to the equitable estate of the vendee and
cannot be cut off by a provision in a contract between the vendor
66
and vendee ;64 (3) a vendee, 65 as well as a vendor, is considered
a freeholder and as such may sign a petition to form a consolidated
school district ;67 (4) a vendee may hold the land which is the subject matter of the contract as a homestead,68 thus making a transfer
of the land by one spouse ineffectual without the signature of the
other 69 and'allowing the vendee benefit of tax reductions ;7o (5) a
vendor is generally liable for taxes due and unpaid when the contract is signed while subsequent taxes which become a lien are the
obligation of the party in possession ;71 (6) a vendor's interest is
taxable as personal property for inheritance tax7 2 purposes; (7)
a vendee in possession is entitled to damages for trespass to the
62. See Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and Trasfer of Title, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 127, 137
(1924).
63. Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 209 N. W. 323 (1926).
However the vendor may be gran:ed the award to hold as trustee for vendee
if the former's security is impaired. See id. at 456, 209 N. W. at 324.
64. Wellington v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry., 123 Minn.
483, 144 N. W. 222 (1913).
65. In re Consolidation of School Districts v. Schultz, 140 Minn. 475,
168 N. W. 552 (1918). The vendee has an estate of inheritance which is an
estate of freehold. Minn. Stat § 500.05 (1953).
66. In re Consolidation of School Districts v. Schmidt, 146 Minn. 403,
178 N. W. 892 (1920). Note that -the factor of the vendor's possession is specifically discounted by the court. See id. at 405, 178 N. W. at 893.
67. Minn. Stat. § 122.20 (1953) requires that the petitioners be "resident freeholders." It would therefore seem that the courts overriding of the
factor of possession, see note 66 :upra, must be confined to whether or not
a vendor is a freeholder and cannot be interpreted as considering as valid
the signature of a vendor who is out of possession at the time of signing.
68. Minn. Stat. §§ 510.01, 510.04 (1953) ; Wilder v. Haughey, 21 Minn.
101 (1874).
69. Minn. Stat. § 507.02 (19.53) ; Wilder v. Haughey, supra note 68.
70. In regard to rural land, compare Minn. Stat. § 273.13(6) (1953),
with Minn. Stat § 273.13(4) (1953). This statement must be confined to
those cases where the vendee has possession. See note 71 infra and text
thereto.
71. See 3 American Law of Property 101 (Casner ed. 1952).
72. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155, 176 N. W.
493 (1920). The vendee's debt was also taxable as a credit for general tax
purposes, State v. Rand, 39 Minn. 502, 40 N. W. 835 (1888), until exempted
from taxation. Minn. Stat. § 285.021 (1953).

NOTE

land ;73 (8) a vendor in possession is liable to the vendee for waste,
yet a vendor may obtain an injunction against a waste-committing
vendee;74 and (9) a vendor is entitled to rents and profits of the
possession arrives at which
land until time for relinquishment of
75
vendee.
the
to
pass
rights
these
time
Another matter of increasing importance concerns the right of
a vendee to remove valuable minerals from the land or to lease
mineral rights to third parties. The obvious objection to this action
is that the vendee or his lessee is committing waste. However, it
must be remembered that the vendee is for all practical purposes the
owner of the land76 and should be allowed to use it as he pleases so
long as he does not reduce its value below the amount owed to the
77
vendor. This would appear to be the applicable rule. A converse
holding would require the vendee to obtain permission from the
vendor before taking any action and as a consequence place the
vendor in a position to "hold-up" the vendee when the former is
only entitled to payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
METHODS FOR INCREASING THE DESIRABILITY OF
USING LAND CONTRACTS

At this point it seems relevant to discuss briefly some of the
economic problems that surround the use of contract for deed in
the sale and purchase of farm land. It has generally been assumed
that a purchaser using this mode of "financing" will be able to
make a much smaller down payment than if a standard mortgage
73. Hueston v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 76 Minn. 251, 79
N. W. 92 (1899). However, if the injury is so great as to impair the vendor's
security, he may be able to have the damages impounded. Id. at 255, 79 N. W.
at 93. But a vendee not in possession may not maintain an action for trespass
since it is a possessory action and constructive possession attaches to the legal
title. Olson v. Minn. & North Wis. R. R., 89 Minn. 280, 94 N. W. 871 (1903).
74. See 1 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 48, § 307; 3 American Law of
Property § 11.32 (Casner ed. 1952).
75. See 3 id. at 69.
76. See note 47 supra and text thereto.
77. It is generally held in cases where a vendee in possession is removing
standing timber that an injunction against removal will not be issued unless
the vendor's security will be rendered insufficient. E.g., Bitting v. Chattooga County Bank, 159 Ga. 78, 124 S. E. 899 (1924) ; Van Wyck v. Alliger,
6 Barb. Ch. 507 (N.Y. 1849); Scott v. Wharton, 2 Hen. & M. 25 (Va.
1808) ; Core v. Bell, 20 W. Va. 169 (1882) ; see Small v. Slocumb, 112 Ga.
279, 281, 37 S.E. 481, 482) (1900). However, one case has held that if the
amount of purchase money remaining due is equal to the value of the land, and
the vendee has liabilities equal to the amount of his other assets, the security
for the purchase price is insufficient. Moses Bros. v. Johnson, 88 Ala. 517, 7

So. 146 (1889).

Since the vendee has an interest that may be leased, see note 52 supra and
text thereto, the same rule would be applicable with the lessee's rights dependent on the vendee's performance of the contract.
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7
There is some evidence that
or purchase money mortgage is usedY.
this assumption is a valid one in Minnesota.7 9 What, then, is the
problem? Here is a device by which a young farmer can purchase
land with a down payment which is occasionally as low as a year's
rental.80 What more can he ask? The answer is simple--securitysome better chance to be sure that he will own that land someday.
In a few words, the problem becomes one of increasing vendee
security, yet retaining the low level of down payments. While the
purpose of Minnesota Statute § 559.21 was to alleviate the hardship imposed on the purchaser by taking from the vendor the arbitrary right to cancel the contract without notice, it has already been
shown that in many cases the statute places the purchaser in a
worse position than he was prior to its enactment."' There also
exists a considerable economic disparity between the parties to
many installment contracts,8 2 thus giving the vendor the advantage
of greater bargaining power.
How is it possible to make this instrument more suitable for
farm land purchase without hindering sales to those moderate
means? Four possible solutions are suggested: (1) self-enforcement by practicing attorneys of the canons of professional ethics;
(2) increased buyer awareness; (3) legislation, and (4) a change

8 3

in judicial attitude.

Application of the Sixth Canon
The sixth canon of legal ethics states in part:
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it
is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
The recent survey of vendors and purchases of rural land 8 ' has
disclosed that in almost every case the two parties went to the same
lawyer to have the contract drawn up. Since the vendor is the
78. See Legis., 52 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 130-131 (1938).
79. This information was derived from the field study. See explanatory
note at page 93 supra. Data from this study is now being analyzed by the
Department of Agricultural Economics, Institute of Agriculture of the University of Minnesota.
80. One case was found in which the down payment amounted to approximately eight per cent of the total purchase price.
81. See notes 5-19 supra and text thereto.
82. See Legis., supra note 78, at 129-130.
83. Many courts have defended forfeiture of a purchaser's interest on
nothing but the premise that those having obligations should be urged to
fulfill them. Ibid.
84. See note 79 supra.

NOTE

movant, this attorney represents him ;85 yet in not a single case did
the lawyer suggest that the purchaser retain his own counsel. In
the majority of the cases the purchaser was not even aware that a
law existed by which the vendor could terminate a defaulted contract thirty days after notice of termination resulting in forfeiture
of everything the purchaser had paid.88 In view of the following
excerpt from an Opinion of the Committee of Professional Ethics
of the American Bar Association, there can be no doubt that many
of Minnesota's lawyers are violating the sixth canon of ethics:
"We deem it improper in such a case for the attorney to accept
employment from [one party], unless the [other party] is clearly advised
that he should have counsel and the reasons there7
fore."
One might ask at this point what difference it makes whether
the vendee is represented, for in almost every case the parties have
already decided to use the contract for deed. However, several advantages flow from individual vendee representation. First, it
might be found that the vendee is making a sufficiently large down
payment 88 to demand a deed and give back a purchase money
mortgage. A concrete example may best serve to illustrate this
advantage: Although a vendor had intended to handle the financing on a purchase money mortgage, a vendee, who had a forty percent down payment, purchased on contract for deed because he was
not represented and through ignorance knew nothing about either
instrument or the law applicable thereto.8 9 Proper legal representation might have prevented this.
Secondly, and of much greater importance, is the insertion or
omission of various contract provisions. Since Minnesota has established uniform conveyancing blanks90 it seems appropriate to examine various clauses, particularly those of importance to the vendee,
85. The fee for drawing up the contract will be charged to the vendor.
86. Minn. Stat. § 559.21 (1953). For a discussion of this statute and
other remedies available to the vendor, see notes 10-39 supra and text thereto.
87. A. B. A. Opinion on Professional Ethics and Grievances 224 (1941).
The fact situation for which this opinion was written is not the same as the
one pictured here, but is sufficiently analogous to be applicable.
88. Generally considered to be at least one-third of the total purchase
price.
89. See notes 121-130 infra and text thereto for some comparisons between mortgage and contract for deed.
The argument here presented assumes that purchase under mortgage
is preferable to purchase under contract for deed where a substantial down
payment is made.
90. The standard forms have been approved and recommended for use,
Minn. Stat. § 507.09 (1953), but are not required. Fees for recording other
than these approved forms are twenty-five per cent higher. Minn. Stat.
§ 507.11 (1953).
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in conjunction with the recommended forms of contract for deed."'
The contract should provide for the payment of taxes and
assessments; the standard contract does so, with the vendee being
required to pay them from and after the dates properly inserted in
the contract.

92

Another clause of the standard contract provides that "buildings
and improvements" now on the land and subsequently added thereto "shall be and remain" the vendor's until the contract is completely executed. This provision is apparently inserted to protect
the vendor from the 'commission of waste by the vendee93 and to
grant the vendor the right to any "fixtures" added and attached to
the land. 4 This provision is subject to criticism on two grounds.
First, the word "improvements" is highly ambiguous, 5 thereby
leading to unnecessary litigation; and secondly, there seems little
justification in drafting a standard contract so as to give additional
benefits to the vendor who already has more than enough. Rather, a
clause should be formulated listing as many items as possible and
pre-determining who should receive them if the contract is terminated with only the remainder left to "chance." 98 Here is a point
upon which counsel for the vendee should attempt to bargain.
The standard insurance clause is acceptable for while the vendee
must pay the premiums, the proceeds are applicable to the purchase
price, and everything over the amount owed the vendor must be
remitted to the vendee. Furthermore, the exact amounts of insurance coverage may be and should be determined by the parties.
Since the vendee also has an insurable interest,9 7 he is able to provide for his own insurance coverage.
91. For this purpose Form 54, the individual vendor form, will be used.

Copies of this and other contract for deed forms may be found in 29 Minn.
Stat. Ann. 370-383 (1947).
92. See note 71 supra and txt thereto.

93. See note 74 supra and text thereto.
94. However, cf. Cohen v. Whitcomb, 142 Minn. 20, 170 N. W. 851
(1919) wherein a lease granting the lessor "improvements, repairs or altera-

tions made in or to said buildings" was determined to exclude reference to
removable fixtures.
For a brief resum6 of the general principles applicable to the law of
fixtures in Minnesota, see Northwestern Lumber & Wrecking Co. v. Parker,
125 Minn. 107, 110-113, 145 N. W. 964, 965-966 (1914).
95. Even if "improvements" is defined to exclude removable fixtures, the
question of what is a removable fixture is far from settled and may be for the
jury to decide. See Cohen v. Whitcomb, 142 Minn. 20, 23, 170 N. W. 851, 852

(1919).

96. Articles normally fixtures may be converted by agreement as concerns the parties thereto. Northwestern Lumber & Wrecking Co. v. Parker,
125 Minn. 107, 145 N. W. 964 (1914).
97. See note 62 supra and text thereto.

NOTE

Next is found the provision which allows the buyer to terminate
the contract in accord with Minnesota Statute § 559.21. Since the
purpose of the statute was to allow the vendee more grace,98 it
would seem doubtful that a court would construe a provision allowing the vendee sixty or ninety days within which to make up a default as invalid. 0 Purchaser representation might result in a more
extended term for reinstatement.
One other clause of the standard contract deserves mentionthe one which by implication gives possession to the vendee from
the date of execution of the contract. This clause is extremely important in view of the Minnesota ruling that the vendor retains the
right to possession unless the vendee is granted the right expressly 10 or by necessary implication.11 In every land contract the ques-

tion of possession should be specifically determined.
Several other possible clauses should be given consideration.
First is what might be termed a pre-payment provision. If this
privilege is not extended to the vendee, the vendor need not accept
payments in advance or for more than the amount stipulated in the
contract. 10 2 This means that a purchaser who has a good crop in
one year may be unable to reduce his debt by more than the amount
due in that year. As a result he must (1) continue to pay interest
on "borrowed" money and (2) face the possibility of defaulting in
a future year when only a small crop may be harvested. A default
might be forestalled if, coupled with a pre-payment provision, an
additional clause is inserted to the effect that advance or over payments will be applied to subsequent installments and the vendee will
not be considered in default as to principal unless the total amount
of his payments falls below the schedule set out in the contract. 103
Pre-payment provisions are also the concern of the vendor who
has sold on installments to enable him to spread his capital gains
over a period of years. If he receives over thirty per cent in the year
98. See note 11 supra and text thereto.
99. It is conceded, however, that the statute as worded is highly
inflexible.
Particularly should greater leniency be granted by the vendor where the
purchaser makes a more substantial down payment.
100. See Boeck v. Johnson, 161 Minn. 248, 250, 201 N. W. 311, 312
(1924); Townshend v. Goodfellow, 40 Minn. 312, 315, 41 N. W. 1056, 1507

(1889).

101.

(1903).

Olson v. Minn. & North Wis. R. R., 89 Minn. 280, 94 N. W. 871

102. Porten v. Peterson, 139 Minn. 152, 166 N. W. 183 (1918); see
Note, 17 A. L. R. 866 (1922). Of course much depends on how the payment
provisions are worded..
103. Such additional provision is necessary to insure the desired result.
See Note, 48 A. L. R. 273 (1927).
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of sale he must pay taxes on the entire profit, whereas by disposing
of his property "... on the instalment plan [he] may return as
income therefrom in any taxable year that proportion of the instalment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit,
realized or to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the
total contract price."'11 4 One significant change effected by passage
of the new Internal Revenue Code allows the installment method
of accounting even though nc down payment is made in the taxable
year of sale. 105
No clause concerning crops appears in the standard contract.
However, in view of the fact that a vendor has the exclusive right
to crops unsevered at the time of contract cancellation,100 a clause
allowing the vendee a right of entry to cultivate and harvest crops
he has sown, with the vendor receiving a share as rent for the use
of the land during this period of wrongful exclusion, 0 7 would be
but reciprocal justice. The leislative answer to this problem would
be to include vendees under contract for deed within the coverage
of existing statutes which allow mortgagors to grow and harvest
crops even though their year of redemption expires during the
growing season.'08
While the farmer is most likely to have difficulty in meeting his
obligations during the first few years after purchase, very few
amortized payment plans were found in existence. 09 The use of
this type of payment plan will reduce the overall amount payable
in the early years of the cont:ract as compared to an equivalent nonamortized arrangement, but will require relatively greater payments
in later years, when the ptvrchaser will normally be in a better
position to pay."t 0 Amortized payment plans should be particularly
104. Int. Rev. Code § 453(a.) (1954). Also see id. § 453(b).
105. Compare Int Rev. Code §§ 44(a), (b) (1939) with Int. Rev. Code
§ 453(b) (2) (A) (i) (1954).
106. Roehrs v. Thompson, 185 Minn. 154, 240 N. W. 111 (1932).
107. This suggestion was advanced in id. at 159, 240 N. W. at 113, but
as applied to future legislation. Until the rural legislators can convince their
city brethren that some such action is advisable the above is offered as a
solution.
108. Minn. Stat. §§ 561.11-561.16 (1953). Concededly the problem is
somewhat different and cannot be solved by adding the words "and vendee
under a contract for deed," but it is a starting point for the type of legislation needed.
109. This finding is a result of the afore-mentioned survey. See explanatory note, p. 93 supra.
110. The difference, of course, comes from the fact that under the
amortized plan the total payment is constant, being apportioned to interest
and principal with greater amounts going to interest in earlier years and
lesser amounts in later years. Under a non-amortized plan the principal payment is constant with the amount of interest steadily reducing. In either
case interest is payable on the unpaid balance.

1954]

NOTE

helpful to a beginning farmer who may be starting with little capital
and has other installment payments coming due. Little vendor
opposition should be encountered if the plan is fully explained,
with the possible exception of those cases in which the vendor feels
he may die before the contract has been fully performed and would
prefer receiving more money in its early years. Conversely, this
greater adaptability of the amortized plan to budgeted living should
greatly appeal to most vendors.","
Another aspect of the law of contract for deed, that of recordation, provides an opportunity for counsel for the vendee to be
helpful.
It was disclosed by the survey that very few vendors or
vendees understood why it was necessary to record their contract.
Although it is true that possession of the land by the vendee
is notice of his rights to subsequent purchaserse1 2 and judgment
creditors," 3 thereby affording him protection analogous to that of
the recording act,1 4 he is not protected if he himself is a subsequent5
purchaser unless he records before the prior purchaser does so."2
Other factors pertaining to the matter of recording include: costs of
recordation ;1 6 that recording is unnecessary for the purchaser to
claim the homestead tax rate ;117 that the mortgage registration tax
must be paid before the contract can be successfully used in evidence" or terminated" 0 by the vendor, and probably the single,
most important, item to consider-the character of the vendor. It
seems advisable to inform each party of the pros and cons of recordation and allow them a voice in the decision.
While vendee representation is but one aspect of the problem of
the beginning farmer, it is a starting point; and if both the attorney
and the vendee become conscious of the advantages accruable to
111. For aid in drafting contracts and for other clauses applicable to
contract for deed see the references in Bade, Cases and Materials on Real
Property and Conveyancing, 106 n. 28 (1954). See also 3 American Law of
Property §.q 11.42-11.52. (Casner ed. 1952).
112. See Niles v. Cooper, 98 Minn. 39, 42-43, 107 N. W. 744, 745 (1906).
113. See Farmers State Bank v. Cunningham, 182 Minn. 244, 246-247,
234 N. W. 320, 321 (1931) ; cf. Northvestern Land Co. v. Dewey, 58 Minn.
359, 59 N. W. 1085 (1894).
114. Minn. Stat. § 507.34 (1953).
115. Ibid. (notice race recording act).
116. Minn. Stat §§ 287.02, 287.05 (1953) provide for a registration tax
of $.15 per $100 of the unpaid balance of the purchase price at the inception.
of the contract. In addition, of course, there are the normal recording fees.
117. See Rep. Atty. Gen. Minn. 412, Ip. 351 (1936).
118. Minn. Stat § 287.10 (1953).
119. Engel v. Mahlen, 153 Minn. 1, 189 N. W. 422 (1922), 7 Minn.
L. Rev. 70. The time of payment is not important so long as it precedes enforcement of the contract or its use as evidence. Kirk v. Welch, 212 Minn.
300, 3 N. W. 2d 426 (1942).
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each, the Utopia envisaged by the drafters of the sixth canon of
professional ethics may soon be achieved. 2 '
Legislative Approach
A second avenue for improvement in the contract for deed
may be achieved through legislative action. There is ample support
for the statement that the present statute providing for forfeiture
for failure to remove a default within thirty days after service of
notice of termination, is unduly harsh and inelastic. 1 21 However,
it must be remembered that an attempt to remove these elements of
harshness and rigidity may result in increasing the amount of down
payment required, thus in part reducing the effectiveness of the
land contract as a method of acquiring farm land.
Before examining legislation of other jurisdictions to determine
if any guide is provided for a solution to these problems, it is necessary to review various legislative actions that may have the adverse
effect of raising down payment requirements.1 22 This may be done
by comparing briefly the legal and economic aspects of mortgage
financing with those of contract for deed.
It may be stated generally that the legal relationship of vendor
and purchaser under a contract for deed is substantially that of
mortgagee and mortgagor 1 23 and "[t]he only difference is a more
efficient remedy in case of default.' ' 24 This remedy differential must
then account for the disparity in amount of down payment required under these two methods of land purchase. The statutory
120. Not only should the buyer benefit but the lawyer as well. More

lawyers will have additional work; and if the vendee feels that he is being
counselled he will be willing to pay a larger fee which will be justified in
that the lawyer will be doing a more thorough job.
It is the intention of the Department of Land Economics of the Institute
of Agriculture of the University of Minnesota to disseminate information that
should educate the farmer to the extent of realizing his legal needs in this
field.
121. For examples of the attitude propounded by the judiciary see
Roehrs v. Thompson, 185 Minn. 154, 159, 240 N. W. 111, 113 (1932); Smith
v. Dristig, 176 Minn. 601, 602, 224 N. W. 157 (1929) ; Follingstad v. Syverson, 160 Minn. 307, 311-312, 200 N. W. 90, 92 (1924).
Further evidence lending credence to this conclusion is that it was necessary to obviate the statute's severity during a period of economic crisis. See
Minn. Laws 1933, c. 422, discussed in Current Legis., 18 Minn. L. Rev.
53, 57 (1933).
122. It is beyond the scope of this Note to attmept to determine the
difficult economic question of whether some slight rise in down payment requirements is desired in some cases thus forcing many fringe buyers to lease
farms for a few years before attempting to purchase.
123. See, e.g., Kreuscher v. Roth, 152 Minn. 320, 324, 188 N. W. 996,
997 (1922) ; Nolan v. Greeley, 150 Minn.441, 442, 185 N. W. 647, 648 (1921);
see Ballantine, supra note 3, at 347.
124. Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn.453, 455, 209 N. W. 323, 324

(1926).

NOTE
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remedy for contract default is a swift, inexpensive action in pai
which terminates the vendee's rights in thirty days,1 25 but a mortgage default generally results in foreclosure by sale,'1 2 which allows
the mortgagor one year from the date of sale in cases of foreclosure
by advertisement, 1217 and from the date of confirmation of sale in
cases of foreclosure by action, 1 28 in which to redeem the property.
In addition to the statutory time differential, an additional period
must be ascribed to the mortgage because of the procedure involved. 12 9 Moreover, foreclosure by sale is expensive. 30 It follows
logically that a vendor who is required to wait over a year after
default in order to repossess' 3' will insist on greater security than
one who need wait only thirty days; therefore, any proposed legislation must avoid overextension of the reinstatement period.
A vast majority of states have enacted no special legislation
:regarding installment land contracts. 13 2 However, there are a few,
in addition to Minnesota, who have made a positive effort to aid
-the vendee. Iowa's statutory answer 33 to the problem is virtually
'identical to that of Minnesota and was originally enacted in the
same year-1897. Louisiana's statute is worded specifically in terms
of installment land contracts 34 and provides a forty-five day reinstatement period measured from the mailing date of notice to the
vendee.235 North Dakota provides a similar stutory remedy, the
major difference being that the grace period allowed is one year. 36
South Dakota expressly codifies strict foreclosure, setting a ten
day minimum in which the defaulting vendee can comply with the
judgment, and then allowing the court to equitably adjust the
125. Minn. Stat. § 559.21 (1953). Pertinent parts of the statute are
quoted at note 12 supra.
126. However, strict foreclosure may be allowed where just or appropriate. Minn. Stat. § 581.12 (1953).
127. Minn. Stat. § 580.23 (1953). This method is more frequently used
in Minnesota than foreclosure by action because it is faster and less expensive.
128. Minn. Stat. § 581.10 (1953).
129. Six weeks' published notice is required in a foreclosure by advertlisement, Minn. Stat. § 580.03 (1953). With a foreclosure by action the time
required is that necessary to get into court.
130.

Osborne, Mortgages § 318 (1951).

131. If payments are made annually the mortgagee must wait over two
years from the last payment before the opportunity arises to gain possession
of the land.
132. A few states did adopt a certain section of the Field Code, see
Legis., supra note 78 at 131 n. 17, which, although apparently applicable to
land contracts, was rendered nugatory by judicial antipathy. See id. at 131135; see also Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts, 14 Minn. L.
Rev. 342, 353-359 (1930).

133.
134.
135.
136.

Iowa Code Ann. §§ 656.1-656.6 (1950).
La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2941) (1950).
Id. § 9:2945.
N. D. Rev. Code § 32-1801 et seq. (1943).
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rights of the parties. 13 Only the North Dakota legislation would
satisfy the vendee's need for security, but it seems obvious that
the allowance of a year in which to reinstate the contract may well
result in raising down payment requirements to a level at least
equal to that of purchase money mortgages.
The State of Michigan allows a defaulting vendee ninety days
from the date of judgment to pay the amount found due in summary
proceedings initiated by the vendor for the restitution of land.'"
While greater leeway is granted the vendee, the statute is inelastic
and minus the attributes of an action in pais.
Two states have approached the problem somewhat differently.
The Arizona statutes contain what might be termed an escalator
clause providing that, as the amount of the purchaser's equity increases, a longer period of "grace" is allowed for default. Thus, if
the vendee has under twenty per cent equity, he is allowed thirty
days of "grace"; if he has an equity of fifty percent or more, he is
given nine months. Shorter periods are allowed where the equity
is under fifty percent. 3 9 The "sleeper" contained in this act is that
the period of "grace" begins to run from the date of default 40 and
not from the date of service of notice of default, which means that
a defaulting vendee may have forfeited his payments without realizing it.
Maryland is the most recent state to enact legislation concerning
installment land contracts. 41 An installment land contract is defined as an executory contract for the sale of land in which the
vendee is to pay the purchase price in five or more installments
exclusive of a down payment and in which the vendor is to retain
title as security. 42 Corporations are expressly excluded from this
vendee category. 43 Further, the act makes mandatory the insertion
of certain specific clauses in the contract. For example, the contract must provide the vendee with the privilege of prepayment;',"
and when the vendee has paid forty percent or more of the cash
price, he can demand a deed and continue financing on the same
terms under a purchase money mortgage. 45 The vendor must serve
137. S. D. Code § 37.3101 eI seq. (1939).
138. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.1999 (1938). This remedy is not exclusive,
however.
139. Ariz. Code Ann. § 71-126 (1939).
140. Ibid.; see Alger v. Brighter Days Min. Corp., 63 Ariz. 135, 142,
160 P.2d 346, 350 (1945).
141. Md. Laws 1951, c. 596, § 117.

142. Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 21, § 118(1) (1951).
143. Id. § 118(5).
144. Id. § 120(3).
145. Id. § 120(7).
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notice of termination and the vendee is allowed thirty days after
14 61
the mailing date of the notice to reinstate the contract. However,
if an actual termination is completed, the vendor's remedy to repossess is limited to a sale of the premises exactly as if he were a
mortgagee. 47 Again the criticism of inelasticity is applicable. While
the required sale of the premises is a step in the right direction, it
is actually of little practical value to the debtor because (1) there
is a lack of energetic advertising attached to the proceeding, (2)
the buyer must pay cash within a short time after purchase and
(3) the mortgagee can bid in his debt.

48

Moreover, it seems that

limiting the scope of the legislation to those contracts where five or
more payments are to be made is an arbitrary dichotomy. Certainly
a purchaser who is to make four payments of $5,000 is entitled to
the same protection as one who is to make five payments of $4,000
in addition to down payments.

1 49

In general, two possibilities appear for legislative action. The
first would retain the grace period of thirty days when very small
down payments are made, e.g., ten per cent, with the duration of
reinstatement time increasing to a maximum of six months when
forty per cent or more of the original purchase price has been
paid. 1 0 This type of statute retains the advantage of in pais action
and allows little time for the vendee to reinstate his contract in
those cases where he has a relatively minor interest in the property
and the tendency for willful default is more probable. It is unlikely
that this legislative change would increase down payment requirements, but the advantage of additional security to the buyer is
limited.
A second course of action would abolish the element of forfeiture by requiring a sale of the property. Statutory provision for
adequate advertising, with the cost to be deducted from the proceeds
of the sale, should be enacted. The purchaser at the sale should be
allowed sixty to ninety days in which to make payment. These
latter two provisions should considerably broaden the number of
prospective purchasers of the land. The present thirty day notice
146. Id. §§ 121(1), (2)(b), (4).
147. Id. § 123. A sale is then subject to court confirmation, id. art. 66,

§ 7, and the vendee to a deficiency judgment. Id. § 14.

148. See Beuscher, Law and the Farmer 89-90 (1953).
149. It is suggested that our statute be rephrased to refer expressly to
installment land contracts.
For proposed legislation the scope of which was based on the number
of payments to be made see Legis., supra note 78, at 135 n. 50.
150. The factor of vendee improvements may be given consideration,
see id. at 135, but this may lead to valuation problems and thereby probably
preclude retaining the in pais form of recovery.
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provisions would be retained and upon completion of filing of proof
of service of notice and failure of the vendee to rectify the default,
the sheriff should be directed to take the necessary steps to hold
the sale within as short a period as is commensurate with the advertising requirements. Furthermore, if the proceeds of the sale are
not equal to the amount of the vendee's debt a deficiency judgment
should be automatically allowed for the difference between the
amount bid at the sale and the amount owed by the vendee. No
redemption from this sale should be allowed. This remedy should
maximize the security of the vendee by reducing to a minimum the
element of forfeiture, since an amount paid for the land at the
sheriff's sale in excess of the vendee's debt would be returned to
him. It should also contain the level of down payments, except in
those cases where the vendor sells with the express desire of re5
gaining his land plus what the vendee has paid in.' ' In order that
the purpose of these statutes be safeguarded the use of all types of
52

acceleration clauses should be eliminated.1
CONCLUSION

While there remain a few instances in which the judiciary may
render decisions helpful to the defaulting vendee, the problem of
surmounting the doctrine of stare decisis must be faced in most
cases.' 53 Two avenues of aid remain open-the combination of vendee representation and education, and legislation. Although each
alone would be extremely helpful, complementary action would be
preferable. The ultimate effect: would be to increase the usefulness
of the contract for deed as an instrument enabling deserving farmers
with limited capital to acquire a farm.
151. This type of vendor is rare; but where he does exist, he is a threat
to any buyer. An increase in tiis type of person's down payment requirement, reducing the field of potential buyers should not be considered a
loss, for fringe buyers are not in a position to be purchasing from a "shark."
152. See Legis., supra note 78, at 136. See notes 22-25 supra and text
thereto for a discussion of acceleration clauses.
153. See, e.g., notes 14-17 surra and text thereto for a discussion of the
possible interpretations of Minn. Stat § 559.21 (1953). The difficulty of overturning the interpretation accepted by the court and followed for many years
cannot be overemphasized.

